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FALLING SHORT OF THE PROMISE OF THE THIRTEENTH 
AMENDMENT: TIME FOR CHANGE 
Michael A. Lawrence* 
ABSTRACT 
This Essay seeks to shine additional light on the 
potential of the underutilized Thirteenth Amendment (as 
contrasted to the much-litigated Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection Clause) for advancing racial justice and 
equity. The Essay suggests the Thirteenth Amendment 
provides strong constitutional basis for an unapologetic 
embrace of the sorts of new, race-conscious measures 
that will be necessary to begin to achieve true racial 
equity in a country that for centuries has erected massive 
structural barriers to Black opportunity and advancement. 
 
Rarely has the tragic fact of Black death been as urgently in need of 
interpretation and engagement as in this moment. America has been 
trying for a couple centuries now to reconcile its self-image as a shining 
beacon of democracy with the nation’s corrupted and unjust practices. 
We have promised time and again to change from within, motivated by 
some crisis, moved by some uprising, shamed by some catastrophe that 
wore on our consciences. But each time we bowed to the inertia brought 
on by half-hearted measures. 
- Michael Eric Dyson, 20201 
 
A cry for racial justice some 400 years in the making moves us. The 
dream of justice for all will be deferred no longer. . . . A cry that can’t be 
any more desperate or any more clear. And now a rise of political 
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 1.  MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, LONG TIME COMING: RECKONING WITH RACE IN AMERICA 47-48 
(2020). 
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extremism, white supremacy, domestic terrorism that we must confront 
and we will defeat. . . . . We can deliver racial justice. 
- Joseph R. Biden, Jr., January 20, 20212 
 
If we learned anything from 2020, that annus horribilis, it is that 
white supremacy is alive and well in America today. And that its 
proponents will go to shocking lengths to perpetuate it-as proven (yet 
again) by their riot and insurrection at the United States Capitol on 
January 6, 2021. 
In 2020 we witnessed another series of egregious events, most 
shocking the videotaped murder of George Floyd by Minneapolis police, 
that galvanized the world—finally—to emphatically protest racially 
abusive police practices.3 As horrible as these events have been, however, 
there may be silver linings in the response. “Something feels different 
now, but how far are we willing to go?” asks Dr. Michael Eric Dyson. 
“Are we prepared to sacrifice tradition and convention for genuine 
transformation? Are we prepared to reckon with the disastrous social 
forces that have been unleashed in such unprecedented fashion?”4 
Will this time be different? “To me, this feels less and less like just 
another iteration of the set-piece drama we’ve lived through so many 
times,” writes Washington Post columnist Eugene Robinson. “[A]n unjust 
killing, a few days of protest, a chorus of promises of reform, a return to 
normal, an all-too-brief interlude until the next unjust killing. This 
eruption feels like a potential inflection point, a collective decision that 
‘normal’ is no longer acceptable.”5 And: “One of the most hopeful and 
heartening features of the current protests has been the images of people 
of all races, in this country and around the world, openly supporting anti-
racism [and] . . . carrying Black Lives Matter posters in discussing the 
matter of state violence against black people,” New York Times columnist 
Charles Blow suggests.6 “The challenge here is to sustain the current 
sentiment and not let this version of Freedom Summer be yet another 
 
 2.  Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Presidential Inaugural Address, Washington, D.C., (Jan. 20, 2021).  
 3.  See, e.g., How George Floyd’s Death Sparked Protests Around the World, WASH. POST 
(June 10, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/2020/06/10/how-george-floyds-
death-sparked-protests-around-world. 
 4.  DYSON, supra note 1, at 47. 
 5.  Eugene Robinson, We Are the Governed. We No Longer Consent to Let the Police Kill Us, 
WASH. POST (June 1, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/we-are-the-governed-we-no-
longer-consent-to-let-the-police-kill-us/2020/06/01/9fad7274-a440-11ea-bb20-
ebf0921f3bbd_story.html. 
 6.  Charles M. Blow, Allies, Don’t Fail Us Again, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/07/opinion/white-privilege-civil-rights.html. 
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moment when allies fail.”7 When it comes to matters of racial justice, the 
time for half-measures is past. “Rarely has the tragic fact of Black death 
been as urgently in need of interpretation and engagement as in this 
moment,”8 Dr. Dyson observes. And, for once, a sitting President is 
saying that Americans can no longer continue to separate themselves from 
the evils of white supremacy and systemic racism.9 
This Essay seeks to shine additional light on the potential of the 
underutilized Thirteenth Amendment (as contrasted to the much-litigated 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause) for advancing racial 
justice and equity. Building upon two recent Articles, The Thirteenth 
Amendment as Basis for Racial Truth & Reconciliation (2020)10 and 
Racial Justice Demands Truth & Reconciliation (2018),11 the Essay 
suggests the Thirteenth Amendment provides strong constitutional basis 
for an unapologetic embrace of the sorts of new, race-conscious measures 
that will be necessary to begin to achieve true racial equity in a country 
that for centuries has erected massive structural barriers to Black 
opportunity and advancement. 
Until now, such measures have been thwarted by the Supreme 
Court’s cramped reading of the Equal Protection Clause.12 The Thirteenth 
Amendment, in banning slavery outright, is not so limited.13 And the 
Supreme Court itself has clearly explained that Congress has broad scope 
under its Section 2 enforcement power “rationally to determine what are 
the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that 
determination into effective legislation.”14 
Neither are State nor local governments constrained in their own 
efforts, legislative and otherwise, to eradicate the badges and incidents of 
slavery. Every law student learns that it is the states, not the federal 
government, that retain the general “police power” to regulate for the 
 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  DYSON, supra note 1 at 47. 
 9.  Biden, supra note 2. 
 10.  Michael A. Lawrence, The Thirteenth Amendment as Basis for Racial Truth & 
Reconciliation, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 637 (2020) (discussing the Thirteenth Amendment’s potential for 
advancing meaningful racial justice reform). 
 11.  Michael A. Lawrence, Racial Justice Demands Truth & Reconciliation, 80 U. PITT. L. REV. 
69, 72 (2018)  (detailing the history of four centuries of racial injustice in North America; discussing 
the need for remediation; and providing examples of local, state, and international truth and 
reconciliation processes). 
 12.  See infra notes 20-289 and accompanying text; see also Lawrence, Thirteenth Amendment, 
supra note 10, at notes 25-59 and accompanying text. 
 13.  See infra notes 29-445 and accompanying text; see also Lawrence, Thirteenth Amendment, 
supra note 10, at notes 92-187 and accompanying text.  
 14.  Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968). 
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health, safety, and welfare of the citizenry. And it is a dominant lodestar 
of conservative jurisprudence that guides courts to accord great respect 
and deference to state sovereignty and states’ rights with respect to the 
states’ police power prerogatives. So there is strong reason for the 
judiciary to apply the highest possible measure of deference to states’ 
actions seeking to eradicate once and for all what they have identified to 
be the badges and incidents of slavery; and, correspondingly, there is little 
reason for courts to interfere with those actions.15 
 
*  *  * 
 
The Thirteenth Amendment, part of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments, provides: 
 
Sec. 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, 
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. 
 
Sec.2. Congress shall have power to enforce this 
article by appropriate legislation. 
 
Historian Eric Foner, the dean of Reconstruction studies, suggests in 
a new book, The Second Founding, that the changes brought about by the 
three constitutional amendments (the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth) ratified during the Reconstruction era (the decade or so 
following the Civil War) were so profound that they “should be seen not 
simply as an alteration of an existing structure but as a ‘second founding,’ 
a ‘constitutional revolution’ . . . that created a fundamentally new 
document with a new definition of both the status of blacks and the rights 
of all Americans.”16 Professor Foner’s study describes how the 
amendments are evidence of “the rapid evolution of thinking in which 
previously distinct categories of natural, civil, political, and social rights 
merged into a more diffuse, more modern idea of citizens’ rights.” More 
importantly for present purposes, Foner suggests that “more robust 
interpretations of the amendments are possible, as plausible, if not more 
 
 15.  See infra notes 29-44 and accompanying text. 
 16.  ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 
REMADE THE CONSTITUTION xx (2019). 
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so, in terms of the historical record, than how the Supreme Court has in 
fact construed them.”17 
It is true that over time the Supreme Court largely has been no friend 
to racial justice and equity.18 And it is not just the Supreme Court of old— 
of Dred Scott (1856), Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), or even Korematsu 
(1944) infamy19—that earn these low marks. It is the Supreme Court of 
today, of the modern twenty-first century that still turns a blind eye to the 
realities, on the ground, of systemic racial injustice. It is the Supreme 
Court of 2007, for example, striking down as unconstitutional two K-12 
school districts’ racial balancing plans that had been designed to comply 
with the mandate to develop desegregation plans from Brown v. Board of 
Education fifty years earlier, stating, “The way to stop discrimination on 
the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”20 And it is 
the Supreme Court of 2013, holding that Congress’s exercise of its 
Fifteenth Amendment Section 2 enforcement power in reauthorizing a key 
portion of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 did not meet (a watered-down 
version of) rational basis review—notwithstanding an overwhelmingly 
bipartisan vote in Congress (98–0 in the Senate; 390–33 in the House) and 
mountains of congressional findings.21 (It adds insult to injury, with 
 
 17.  Id. at xxv (emphasis added). 
 18.  An anomalous exception is the period from 1953-1969 when Earl Warren served as Chief 
Justice, during which time the Court handed down a number of racial justice-friendly decisions, most 
notably Brown v. Board of Education in 1954.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). See generally, e.g., Michael A. 
Lawrence, Justice-as-Fairness as Judicial Guiding Principle: Remembering John Rawls and the 
Warren Court, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 673 (2016) (describing the equity-based jurisprudence of the 
Warren Court). 
 19.  Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (holding that a former slave is not a “citizen” 
entitled to bring a case in federal court); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that 
“separate but equal” public services do not violate the equal protection clause); Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that Japanese internment camps do not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause). 
 20.  Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007). 
Justice Stevens responded to Chief Justice Roberts’ reasoning in his dissent:  
There is a cruel irony in The Chief Justice’s reliance on our decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education. The first sentence in the concluding paragraph of his opinion states: “Before 
Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and could not go to school based on 
the color of their skin.” This sentence reminds me of Anatole France’s observation: “[T]he 
majestic equality or the la[w], . . . forbid[s] rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to 
beg in the streets, and to steal their bread.” The Chief Justice fails to note that it was only 
black schoolchildren who were so ordered; indeed, the history books do not tell stories of 
white children struggling to attend black schools. In this and other ways, The Chief Justice 
rewrites the history of one of this Court’s most important decisions. 
 Id. at 798–99 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 21.  See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 550–51 (2013) (concluding that the statute 
was “[no longer] rational in both practice and theory”). This despite the fact that the  
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respect to the Court’s future prospects regarding racial justice, to note that 
these two later cases were both decided even before the addition of three 
more conservative justices to the Court in 2017, 2018, and 2020.)22 
This Lochnerian sort of judicial activism is simply inappropriate in a 
constitutional system based on separation of powers and coequal branches 
of government. The Court is operating outside of its constitutional 
guardrails and needs to make a conscious effort to move back into its own 
lane. Part of that task will be to undertake its interpretive role with greater 
humility, and with increased recognition of the proper roles of the other 
players operating within the constitutional framework. A full discussion 
of the “departmental theory” of constitutional interpretation is beyond the 
scope of this Essay, but suffice it to say that there are numerous prominent 
constitutional scholars arguing against the propriety of the modern 
Court’s insistence upon its own concept of strong judicial supremacy.23 
 
House and Senate Judiciary Committees held 21 hearings . . . [and compiled a 15,000 
page] legislative record [that] presents countless ‘examples of flagrant racial 
discrimination.’ . . . [and which] was described by the Chairman of the House Judiciary 
Committee as “one of the most extensive considerations” of any piece of legislation that 
the United States Congress has dealt with in the 27 years’ he had served in the House.  
Id. at 565–93 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (stating the majority’s decision to “[t]hrow[] out preclearance 
when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop discriminatory changes is like throwing away 
your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet”). See also, Lawrence, Thirteenth 
Amendment, supra note 10, at note 163 and accompanying text. 
 22.  Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett were confirmed as associate 
justices to the U.S. Supreme Court in 2017, 2018 and 2020, respectively.  
 23.  See, e.g., Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Linking the Questions: Judicial Supremacy as a Matter of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1309, 1317-1322 (2012) (stating that nowhere 
does the Constitution designate the Court as its exclusive interpreter: 
Scholars of popular constitutionalism have turned to history to show that judicial 
supremacy is not inevitable. . . .  By the early nineteenth century, the departmental theory 
emerged as the dominant [competing theory]. From James Madison to Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, a series of Presidents and prominent constitutional thinkers took the view that 
each department of government had been granted an independent responsibility to 
interpret the Constitution. . . .  Each branch would be a check against the potential tyranny 
of the others, and the public would ultimately adjudicate, including at the polls.  
Moreover, with respect to Philip Bobbitt’s commonly-discussed six modalities of constitutional 
interpretation - historical, textual, structural, doctrinal, prudential, and ethical: 
[T]he judiciary is uniquely situated only with respect to some. . . .  The Court’s claim to 
expertise is strongest when it is engaging in interpretive modalities for which lawyers are 
uniquely trained and the judicial forum is particularly well suited. . . . . The Court’s claim 
to interpretive expertise is at its lowest ebb when it resolves constitutional ambiguity 
through interpretive modalities for which lawyers are not uniquely trained. Specifically, 
where the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution ultimately rests on prudential and 
ethical argument, it lacks a special claim to interpretive expertise. Nonjudicial actors are 
at least as good at making these sorts of arguments about the Constitution, if not better. 
Prudential arguments are essentially policy arguments. They are arguments about the 
consequences of competing constitutional rules, and they turn on empirical facts. Policy 
arguments are a regular feature of legislative hearings as well as official and private 
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Indeed, according to Eric Foner, “in terms of the historical 
record, . . . more robust interpretations of the amendments are [at least as] 
plausible” as the interpretations heretofore made by the Supreme Court. 
His assessment mirrors and echoes that of many constitutional scholars 
whose studies also conclude that the Reconstruction Amendments are 
powerful tools provided within our constitutional framework that can be 
validly utilized by governmental entities at all levels to enact meaningful 
measures designed to achieve greater racial justice and equity. 
To give just one prominent example, Yale Law Professor Jack Balkin 
argues that all three of the Reconstruction Amendments are entitled to 
high deference under the well-understood and long-accepted principle 
first set down by Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland: 
“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, 
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that 
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, are Constitutional.”24 “The framers of the Reconstruction 
Amendments sought to ensure that the test of McCulloch would apply to 
the new powers created by the Reconstruction Amendments,” Balkin 
explains; “that is why they included the word ‘appropriate’ in the text of 
all three enforcement clauses.”25 
As briefly discussed above, however, over time, the Supreme Court 
has not adhered to the deferential McCulloch-based understanding.26 The 
fact that a majority on the Supreme Court has repeatedly failed to honor 
the constitutional design does not mean the constitutional design 
 
legislative debates. Similarly, the Executive, especially its administrative arm, has both 
expertise and experience in empirical, consequentialist reasoning as well as established 
procedures and forums. . . .  Judges, by contrast are not particularly well positioned to 
adjudicate policy debates, lacking both technical experience. 
Id. at 1332-1335 (citing Philip Bobbitt, The Modalities of Constitutional Argument, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 12-22 (1991)). An awareness of departmental theory by the Supreme Court would 
be most beneficial. Specifically, the Court would understand that it will always retain the “first crack” 
at an issue under our concept of judicial review, but the Court would also be aware of its own inherent 
limitations and maintain proper humility about its own circumscribed role in a system based on 
separation of powers among co-equal branches of government. 
 24.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819) (emphasis added). The Court was 
speaking in reference to the scope of Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution. See Jack Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 1807, 1811 
(2010); see also Lawrence, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 10, at notes 169-183 and 
accompanying text. 
 25.  Jack Balkin, supra note 24, at 1807; see also Akhil Amar, An(other) Afterword on the Bill 
of Rights, 87 GEO. L. J. 2347, 2352 (1999) (“The framers of these Amendments said again and again 
that Congress should have the same broad enforcement power here that the antebellum Court had 
affirmed under the Necessary and Proper Clause in cases like McCulloch and Prigg.”). 
 26.  See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. 
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disappears, however. “The statesmen who drafted the Reconstruction 
Amendments gave Congress independent enforcement powers because 
they feared that the Supreme Court would prove an unreliable guarantor 
of liberty and equality. Their fears were proved correct. Time and again, 
the Supreme Court hobbled Congress’s enforcement powers through 
specious technicalities and artificial distinctions,” Balkin notes.27 “These 
limitations are not required either by the Constitution’s original meaning 
or by principles of federalism. Quite the contrary: Fidelity to text, 
structure, and history gives Congress broad authority to protect equal 
citizenship and equality before the law,” he concludes, asserting, “[i]t is 
long past time to remedy the Supreme Court’s errors, and reconstruct the 
great Reconstruction Power of the Constitution.”28 
Among the Reconstruction Amendments, the Thirteenth, in some 
important respects, stands separate from the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments. Specifically with regard to the Supreme Court’s 
consideration of the three amendments, on the rare occasions when the 
Court has spoken in any depth on the Thirteenth Amendment–principally 
the Civil Rights Cases (1883)29 and Jones v. Alfred Mayer (1968)30—it 
has described in broad terms Congress’s plenary authority to define and 
regulate “badges and incidents of slavery.” 
Moreover, there are compelling textual and structural arguments that 
Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment enforcement authority stands 
separate, even when compared to the analogous provisions in the other 
two Reconstruction Amendments. First, the Thirteenth Amendment is the 
only one of the three whose Section 1 rights-protecting text is free of any 
sort of limiting component,31 stating simply: “Neither slavery nor 
 
 27.  Balkin, supra note 24, at 1861.  
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that Congress has power under the 
Thirteenth Amendment to regulate “badges and incidents” of slavery). 
 30.  Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (reaffirming that “[s]urely Congress has 
the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and the 
incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation.”). 
 31.  The Thirteenth Amendment does provide one caveat, allowing for involuntary servitude in 
the case of “punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.” Tragically, this 
caveat itself has been devastatingly weaponized against people of color. See, e.g., 13TH (Netflix 2016) 
(documenting the history of how the “duly convicted” clause has been disproportionately applied 
against people of color); see also Symposium, Trauma, Policing & The 13th Amendment: The Long 
Arc to Freedom, Univ. of Calif.-Irvine 2019, https://www.law.uci.edu/
centers/cbghp/activities/022219-Trauma-Policing-13th-A-Draft-Schedule.pdf (discussing “how the 
legacy of the Thirteenth Amendment both liberates through the abolition of slavery and yet serves as 
a tool to exploit the vulnerable by permitting slavery so long as an individual is convicted of a crime”). 
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involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States, or any place 
subject to their jurisdiction.”32 
Both of the others extend their protections only against government 
abridgment:33 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor [shall any State] deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.34 
And Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment reads, “The right of 
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude.”35Arguably this textual distinction can explain the 
federalism concerns that dominated the Court’s reasoning in City of 
Boerne v. Flores (Fourteenth Amendment) and Shelby County v. Holder 
(Fifteenth Amendment). In Boerne, for example, regarding Congress’s 
exercise of its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power, the Court says, 
“RFRA’s sweeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every level of 
government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost 
every description,” and so the Court imposes a heavier burden on 
Congress to demonstrate the statute is “congruent and proportional.”36 
The Court placed significant weight on the Amendment’s legislative 
history—i.e., during the drafting process, the framers intentionally 
narrowed the scope of the Section 5 enforcement power—to justify 
imposing greater restrictions on Congress today. Specifically, the Court 
pointed out, after the Amendment’s opponents had argued during the 
debates “that the proposed Amendment would give Congress power to 
intrude into traditional areas of state responsibility, a power inconsistent 
with the design central to the Constitution, . . . [u]nder the [subsequently] 
revised Amendment, Congress’s power was no longer plenary but 
remedial.”37 
 
 32.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 33.  Accordingly, Congress is able to reach private action only through the Thirteenth 
Amendment. 
 34.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 35.  U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 36.  The Court explained that in Section 5 cases Congress must demonstrate “a congruence and 
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means to that end,” rather than 
meet the traditional deferential rational basis standard of review. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507, 520 (1997). 
 37.  Id. at 520–22. 
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Similarly, in Shelby County, in striking down Congress’s exercise of 
its Fifteenth Amendment Section 2 enforcement power, the Court focused 
heavily on the harms done to notions of state sovereignty by the 2006 
reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act.38 “The Framers of the 
Constitution,” the Court explained, “intended the States to keep for 
themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate 
elections.”39 Moreover, in a passage whose very length is instructive in 
demonstrating the weight the Court attached to the sovereignty issue, it 
added: 
States retain broad autonomy in structuring their governments and 
pursuing legislative objectives. . . . This “allocation of powers in our 
federal system preserves the integrity, dignity, and residual sovereignty 
of the States.” . . . [F]ederalism secures to citizens the liberties that 
derive from the diffusion of sovereign power. . . . Not only do States 
retain sovereignty under the Constitution, there is also a “fundamental 
principle of equal sovereignty” among the States. . . . The Voting Rights 
Act sharply departs from these basic principles. It suspends “all changes 
to state election law—however innocuous—until they have been 
precleared by federal authorities in Washington, D.C.” States 
must beseech the Federal Government for permission to implement laws 
that they would otherwise have the right to enact and execute on their 
own. . . . And despite the tradition of equal sovereignty, the Act applies 
to only nine States. . . .40 
By contrast, the Thirteenth Amendment has no such baggage. 
Besides lacking any textual reference to “States,” the Amendment’s 
legislative history is clean as well. While its opponents, mostly Southern 
Democrats, certainly opposed the imposition of the Amendment’s 
constraints on the states, they lost the debate. Simply put, no opposition 
views on the matter of federalism—protecting states from the 
Amendment—managed to carry the day during the Thirteenth 
Amendment debates.41 Instead, the Amendment’s proponents’ views 
prevailed, as expressed by Senator Trumbull, who brought the 
Amendment to the floor in 1864: “[T]he second clause . . . says that 
Congress shall have authority, by appropriate legislation, to carry into 
effect the article prohibiting slavery,” the Court stated in 1968, quoting 
from the contemporaneous Congressional Globe. “Congress [may] adopt 
 
 38.  Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 543–44 (2013). 
 39.  Id. at 543. 
 40.  Id. at 543–44 (internal citations omitted). 
 41.  See generally James Gray Pope, Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Badges 
and Incidents of Slavery, 65 UCLA L. REV. 426, 433-34 (2018). 
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such appropriate legislation as it may think proper, so that it be a means 
to accomplish the end.”42 
The Court added: “Surely Senator Trumbull was right. Surely 
Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to 
determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the 
authority to translate that determination into effective legislation.”43 
Moreover, none of the Thirteenth Amendment cases have expressed the 
federalism concerns expressed in cases involving the other two 
amendments. 
In sum, in terms of original intent and original understanding, it is 
clear that the framers of the Thirteenth Amendment managed to prevail 
with their vision of a broad Section 2 enforcement power, whereas the 
framers of at least the Fourteenth had to scale back their original broader 
vision. And given the fact that the Thirteenth Amendment is broader in 
scope—i.e., it applies to all action, public and private, whereas the other 
two Amendments are limited solely to state action—one may reasonably 
conclude that it inherently presents fewer direct federalism concerns. 
Accordingly, there is little or no basis for the Court to intrude upon 
Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment authority.44 
 
*   *   * 
 
 42.  Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968) (quoting Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 
1st Sess., 322). 
 43.  Id. at 441. 
 44.  See also Lawrence, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 10, at notes 169-83 and 
accompanying text. 
 The second textual and structural argument that Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment 
enforcement authority stands alone, is novel and untested. Nevertheless, it goes like this: 
The Thirteenth Amendment’s Section 1 rights-protecting text makes no reference to “law” 
(“neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States”); 
whereas the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment do speak of “law” (“nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law;” and “nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the law.”). Here, it makes interpretive sense that the judiciary, as 
the Constitution’s expositor of “what the law is” (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 
(1803) (emphasis added) (stating, “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.”)) would have some proper role in determining the 
scope of Congress’s enforcement of a textual provision that requires either “due process 
of law” or “equal protection of the laws.” By contrast, because the Thirteenth Amendment 
text speaks nowhere of “law(s),” it also makes interpretive sense that the judiciary’s role 
would be more circumscribed in such cases. Stated another way, this textual distinction 
arguably makes a difference in the relative scope of Congress’s power in the two 
provisions: Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power is entitled to the 
heaviest possible deference by the judiciary; whereas the Court perhaps has more basis to 
review Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. 
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Where does all of this leave us today as we strive to move toward a 
more racially-just society? Professor Foner’s recent observations from the 
professional historian’s perspective are important, albeit sobering: 
More recently, we have experienced a slow retreat from the ideal of ra-
cial equality. We live at a moment in some ways not unlike the 1890s 
and early twentieth century, when state governments, with the acquies-
cence of the Supreme Court, stripped black men of the right to vote and 
effectively nullified the constitutional promise of equality. . . .  As his-
tory shows, progress is not necessarily linear or permanent. But neither 
is retrogression.45 
So while the road may seem blocked against racial justice and equity 
at the moment, because retrogression is “not necessarily linear or 
permanent,” we may hope that there is a path for progress—and the 
Thirteenth Amendment may indeed provide an avenue by which federal 
and state lawmakers may proceed, and open an off-ramp of sorts for the 
Supreme Court from the confining strictures of its Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection doctrine. 
Even though the Reconstruction amendments have not (yet) been 
interpreted to achieve their full potential by the Supreme Court, they still 
remain an enduring “declaration of popular rights. They retain unused 
latent power that, in a different political environment, may yet be 
employed to implement in new ways the Reconstruction vision of equal 
citizenship for all.”46 
Who knows? Maybe this precise moment in time—2021—is the sort 
of “different political environment” Professor Foner imagines. 
Specifically, now that Democrats control both Congress and the 
Presidency,47 perhaps they can muster the political will to employ the 
always-available, but as-yet-unused, tool of the Thirteenth Amendment 
“to implement in new ways the Reconstruction vision of [Black] equal 
citizenship.”48 And the Supreme Court, for its part, would then stay within 
its own constitutional guardrails to allow Congress to exercise its plenary 
power to erase the badges and incidents of slavery by whatever rational 
terms Congress might determine—as the framers of the Thirteenth 
Amendment originally intended. 
 
 45.  FONER, supra note 16, at xxix. 
 46.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 47.  One can imagine that this would be an issue that some Republicans would support as well. 
 48.  FONER, supra note 16, at xxix.  
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In sum, Professor Foner’s lifetime project of studying the history of 
the Reconstruction era, together with the work of many other historians 
and constitutional scholars, has demonstrated that the framers of the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments—the Republican 
majorities in Congress at the time—intended nothing short of a 
“‘constitutional revolution’ . . .  that created a fundamentally new 
document with a new definition of both the status of blacks and the rights 
of all Americans.”49 And, especially with regard to the Thirteenth 
Amendment, the framers intended that Congress should have plenary 
“power to enforce this article with appropriate legislation”50—a 
constitutional delegation of authority expressly acknowledged and 
accepted by the Supreme Court.51 
 
 
 49.  Id. at xx.  
 50.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2. 
 51.  See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. It seems eminently reasonable that at least 
some of the three newest justices on the Supreme Court, see supra note 22, all of whom prominently 
identify as “originalists,” would acknowledge the original intent of the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
framers to delegate to Congress the broad authority to legislate to advance racial equity—especially 
when the Supreme Court’s own precedent has established the same: “Surely Congress has the power 
under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of 
slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation.” Jones, 392 U.S. at 
441. If so, those two, three (or more) conservative justices would then join the three liberal justices 
(presumably) in deferring to Congress’s authority and upholding its legislation. State and local 
governments could follow suit with legislation of their own seeking to promote racial equity by 
erasing the badges and incidents of slavery, and the Court would likewise honor their inherent 
sovereign police power prerogatives to regulate for the public health, safety and welfare. 
